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Genocide Denial as Testimonial Oppression 
Melanie Altanian (University College Dublin) 
This article offers an argument of genocide denial as an injustice perpetrated not 
only against direct victims and survivors of genocide, but also against future 
members of the victim group. In particular, I argue that in cases of persistent and 
systematic denial, i.e. denialism, it perpetrates an epistemic injustice against 
them: testimonial oppression. First, I offer an account of testimonial oppression 
and introduce Kristie Dotson’s notion of testimonial smothering as one form of 
testimonial oppression, a mechanism of coerced silencing particularly pertinent to 
genocide denialism. Secondly, I turn to the epistemology of genocide denialism 
and, using the example of Turkey’s denialism of the Armenian genocide, show 
how it presents what Linda Martín Alcoff calls a substantive practice of 
ignorance. Thirdly, I apply these considerations to individual practices of 
genocide denial and analyse the particular characteristics of testimony on 
genocide, the speaker vulnerabilities involved and the conditions under which 
hearers will reliably fail to meet the dependencies of a speaker testifying to 
genocide. Finally, I explore the harms that testimonial oppression perpetrates on 
members of the victim group, insofar as it systematically deprives them of 
epistemic recognition. 
Keywords: Genocide denial; testimonial oppression; substantive ignorance; 
silencing; epistemic recognition 
I – Introduction 
Genocide denial is often referred to as the ‘final stage of genocide’. However, to speak 
of denial as belonging conceptually to genocide obscures that apologism, legitimation 
and denial are already present prior to and during the crime. With these practices, 
perpetrators prepare the ideological grounds to justify their actions and policies and 
thereby also provide the basis for denialism in the long run. In this article, I focus on the 
practice of genocide denial itself in order to bring to light how it constitutes a further 
injustice perpetrated against the (former) victim group. Addressing the very practice of 
genocide denial will help us identify it as an intergenerational, sustainable 
discrimination policy that gives future members of the victim group continued reasons 
to feel threatened.1 This further enables us to distinguish responsibility for genocide 
from responsibility for its denial, a distinction that is particularly important from the 
point of view of intergenerational justice.  
Such an inquiry is suggested by systematic, institutionalized and structurally 
entrenched cases of genocide denial, such as Turkey’s ongoing denialism of the 
Armenian genocide. Here, succeeding governments are not only reactively, but actively 
and wilfully engaging in genocide denialism through argumentative and narrative, 
factual and normative distortions, many of which are not easily discernible as genocide 
legitimation or racist hate speech. This warrants an in-depth investigation of the 
injustice of genocide denialism at the intersection of ethics and epistemology. More 
specifically, this article aims to identify how genocide denialism constitutes an 
epistemic injustice. I focus here particularly on how conditions of genocide denialism 
give rise to individual practices of denial, i.e., pernicious patterns of communication 
that amount to testimonial oppression. In what follows, I first offer an account of 
testimonial oppression and introduce Dotson’s (2011) notion of testimonial smothering 
as one form of testimonial oppression particularly pertinent to genocide denialism. I 
then turn to the epistemology of genocide denialism and, using the example of Turkey’s 
denialism of the Armenian genocide, show how it presents what Alcoff (2007) calls a 
substantive practice of ignorance. Against this background, I analyse individual (i.e. 
interpersonal) practices of genocide denial, that is, the particular characteristics of 
testimony on genocide, the speaker vulnerabilities involved and the conditions under 
which hearers will reliably fail to meet the dependencies of a speaker testifying to 
genocide. Finally, I explore the harms of testimonial oppression perpetrated against 
members of the former victim group, insofar as it systematically deprives them of 
epistemic recognition. 
II – Testimonial Oppression 
Oppression is a normative concept that names a particular social injustice. I adopt 
Cudd’s empirically informed, univocal concept of oppression as  
institutionally structured harm perpetrated on groups by other groups using direct 
and indirect material and psychological forces that violate justice. ...These forces 
work in part by coercing the oppressed to act in ways that further their own 
oppression. (Cudd 2006, 26) 
Cudd identifies four necessary and sufficient conditions for oppression: There is a harm 
that comes out of an institutional practice2; the harm is perpetrated through a social 
institution or practice on a social group whose identity exists apart from the oppressive 
harm3; there is another (privileged) social group that benefits from this institutional 
practice; and there is unjustified coercion or force that brings about the harm (2006, 25). 
Against this background, I define testimonial oppression as unjustified epistemic 
coercion through (institutional) practices that bring about distinctly epistemic and other 
harms insofar as testifiers occupy a specific, not only epistemically, but also ethically 
relevant status: the status of a knower (or an epistemic agent more generally). Knower is 
therefore also an ethical concept that can be grasped only against the background of 
what it means to live a flourishing human life where testifying is regarded as a capacity 
of essential human value (e.g., Congdon 2018; Fricker 2007, 44, 2015). The primary 
harm of testimonial oppression lies not merely in being disrespected as a full human 
subject on the basis of institutional and structural discrimination, but in thereby being 
stymied in one’s ability to exercise a valuable human capacity, that is, (moral-) 
epistemic agency. Furthermore, the harm is perpetrated against a particular social group 
to the (purported) benefit of another social group. 
To understand how a speaker can be harmed in testimonial practice, we have to 
take into account her relational vulnerabilities in testifying; what she (justifiably) trusts 
the hearer for and what it means for this trust to be betrayed. In particular, speakers trust 
hearers mainly for ‘recognitional epistemic goods’ (Dormandy 2020, 247), consisting in 
the right response to a person’s epistemic agency or to their status as a knower. Thus, 
testimonial oppression refers to conditions and practices that persistently and 
systematically deprive speakers of such recognitional epistemic goods. According to 
Dotson (2011, 244), such testimonial oppression can take, among others, the form of 
‘testimonial smothering’, which occurs when ‘the speaker perceives one’s immediate 
audience as unwilling or unable to gain the appropriate uptake of proffered testimony’.4 
She identifies three, usually interrelated circumstances that routinely give rise to 
testimonial smothering: i) the content of the testimony is unsafe and risky, ii) the 
audience demonstrates testimonial incompetence to the speaker with respect to the 
content of the testimony, and iii) testimonial incompetence follows from, or appears to 
follow from, pernicious ignorance. Under such circumstances, it is likely that speakers 
will be coerced to silence themselves, hence testimonially smothered.  
The content of testimony is unsafe and risky when it leads or contributes to the 
‘formation of false beliefs that can cause social, political, and/or material harm’ (Dotson 
2011, 244). As an illustration, Dotson refers to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1991) analysis of 
women-of-color silencing themselves as regards experiences of domestic violence 
committed by their male, non-white community members, because it might reinforce 
and corroborate the widespread, racist stereotype of the ‘violent black male’. Their 
societal context coerces women-of-color to silence themselves on this matter because it 
is imbued with racist stereotypes and misunderstandings that make testimony on 
domestic violence risky, insofar as it may corroborate such misunderstandings and 
endanger non-white communities even further. (Dotson 2011, 244–245) This relates to 
the testimonial incompetence of an audience, i.e., ‘the failure of an audience to 
demonstrate to the speaker that she/he will find proffered testimony accurately 
intelligible’ (245). Testimony will be accurately intelligible to an audience if it is 
clearly comprehensible and defeasibly intelligible, which includes awareness and 
recognition of epistemic limits, gaps, inaccuracies or uncertainties in one’s 
comprehension. Accordingly, a speaker trusts an audience to exercise testimonial 
competence, meaning ‘to do what it takes to hear what she intends to communicate’ 
(Dormandy 2020, 256). This can also involve trusting the audience to respect any 
emotional or practical risks that a speaker might expose herself to, namely when 
testifying to ‘experiences of marginalization to someone who is likely to have trouble 
relating, especially if their shared conceptual framework cannot easily bridge their 
disparate backgrounds’ (257). In turn, demonstrating testimonial incompetence will 
coerce potential speakers to silence themselves with respect to some domain of 
knowledge. The cultivation of such testimonial incompetence can depend on how a 
certain subject matter is framed in a society’s public discourse. For example, Cassandra 
Byers Harvin illustrates this when she confesses that she has been made to ‘avoid 
speaking candidly about race with her colleagues as a result of the “hurt feelings and 
surprise and defensiveness” that her audience may take on during such conversations’ 
(Harvin 1996, 16, as quoted in Dotson 2011, 247). Harvin describes one encounter in a 
public library with a white woman, “early-50s-looking” who asks Harvin what she is 
working on: 
Harvin responds by indicating she is researching “raising black sons in this 
society”. The white woman promptly asks, “How is that any different from raising 
white sons?” Harvin notes that it is not only the question that is problematic, as it 
indicates a kind of lack of awareness of racial struggles in the United States, but 
also the tone of the question that indicated the white woman believed that Harvin 
was “making something out of nothing”. (Ibid., emphasis added) 
The immediate question, “How is that any different from raising white sons?” as well as 
the tone in which it was asked represents an unnecessarily sceptical question ‘that can 
operate to effectively negate the experiential reality of many people of color’ (Dotson 
2011, 247). Such responses are likely the result of pernicious situated ignorance. One 
could argue that the white woman is ignorant because she was never in a position to 
raise black sons in the U.S.; hence she lacks a socially situated experience. However, in 
addition, she seems ignorant of her own situated unawareness—likely due to further 
protective, cognitive mechanisms akin to what Medina calls privileged ignorance: her 
not needing to know about her own unawareness (viz. ‘epistemic laziness’, Medina 
2013, 33). After all, she could potentially demonstrate testimonial competence despite 
not sharing the same experiential or lived reality of how it is to raise black sons in the 
U.S. She could still accept or be justified in accepting and trusting the black woman’s 
insight and therefore acknowledge this as a conversation one should have insofar as one 
can gain a better understanding of how racism operates in one’s society. This is why 
such a rhetorical or ‘pseudo’-sceptical response can invalidate her as a knower and 
epistemic agent more generally.5 Moreover, situated ignorance likely renders hearers 
unable to acknowledge any emotional or practical risks that speakers expose themselves 
to when testifying to experiences of marginalization. They may thereby, intentionally or 
unintentionally, perpetuate the oppression of the marginalized. I argue that a similar 
practice of silencing can be observed in the case of genocide denialism, insofar as it 
generates pernicious situated ignorance that cultivates testimonial incompetence 
specifically on the subject matter of genocide and makes testimony on genocide unsafe 
and risky, thus paving the way for testimonial smothering. 
III – Genocide Denialism: Generating Pernicious Reliable Ignorance 
Denialism refers to the larger, orchestrated, ideological, political or cultural pattern of 
denial; it tends to include ‘an agenda not necessarily outspoken, a world view, 
argumentative traditions and structures, as well as similar motives and motivations’ 
(Karlsson 2015, 38). Here, I am concerned with genocide denialism as a historically 
rooted practice that authorizes, justifies and imposes a pernicious set of beliefs and 
understandings by: maintaining historically entrenched prejudices against the former 
victim group, misrepresenting social reality, distorting historical facts about genocide as 
well as the social, moral and epistemic norms that ought to guide successful inquiry in 
this domain. On this basis, denial and disputation rather than recognition of genocide 
will appear to be the right thing to do from the perspective of both morality and 
epistemology. I shall illustrate this phenomenon by analysing Turkey’s denialism of the 
Armenian genocide, in particular: the historically entrenched portrayal of Armenians as 
murderous, domestic threats in the founding narrative of the Turkish Republic, as well 
as normative distortions of collective memory through the state policy of just memory.6 
Note that genocide denialism does not merely consist in disputing whether the legal 
term of genocide can be applied to the historical injustice retrospectively. Rather, it 
consists more generally in challenging whether Armenians have suffered a group-based 
injustice, a type of injustice we have afterwards come to understand as a crime called 
genocide. However we come to define genocide, denialism aims at distorting 
normativity and social reality in a way so as to exclude the Armenian experience from 
this definition of a particular crime against humanity. 
Mustafa Kemal was the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army in the 
Turkish war of independence and the first president of the Turkish Republic. Given his 
authority and, in fact, authoritarianism in narrating Turkish history, he has significantly 
shaped the history of modern Turkey and (Kemalist-) Turkish national identity until 
today. This includes his various speeches from 1917 onwards, in which he repeatedly 
puts rhetorical emphasis on the suffering and oppression of Turks, and Armenians 
murdering Turks during his war of independence, which has led to chronological 
confusions used as retrospective justification for the Armenian genocide to this day. 
More specifically, in his domestic policy, Kemal emphasizes his concern about the 
emergence of an independent Armenia in the East and an Armenian invasion, which 
would make organized national resistance necessary. Even more so, he writes, because 
‘“the Armenian cause is considered to be legitimate by both the western nations and the 
Russian nation”, since Armenians had been portrayed to the West and to the United 
States as “the oppressed”’ (as quoted in Ulgen 2010, 377–378). Neglecting the legacy of 
pogroms and oppression that Ottoman Armenians have experienced and their 
destruction and expulsion from their homeland under Young Turk rule, he in fact 
reverses the claim and highlights the atrocities committed by returning Armenians 
during his war of independence:  
In numerous telegrams and other communications, especially between mid-1919 
and late 1920 – that is, until the defeat of [the First Republic of] Armenia – Kemal 
described the atrocities Muslims suffered around and beyond the eastern border as 
“savagery and murder” …, “destruction and extermination” …, “extermination one 
by one” …, “massacre” …, “policy of Muslim massacre and extermination” …,  
and “oppression and atrocity/carnage”. (Ulgen 2010, 379) 
This rhetoric is repeated in his famous speech from 1927, Nutuk. This speech 
displays almost all the memory tropes still in currency in contemporary Turkey: 
Armenians and the spirit of revenge; Armenians who completely destroyed old 
Muslim towns; Armenians murdering and annihilating thousands of innocent 
women and children; Armenians, the perpetrators of savagery unique in history 
(388).  
Kemal thereby reframes in particular the Battle of Maraş by assimilating Armenians 
into the enemy of the French occupying forces, obscuring the murder of thousands of 
Armenians (including refugees who were repatriated following the genocide) and 
calling the ‘Armenian and Greek army the “old murderers” let loose by the imperialists 
on the Muslims in Anatolia, “the home of Islam since the time of the Seljuk Turks”’ (as 
quoted in Ulgen 2010, 380). This illustrates the continuity of the portrayal of Armenians 
(and other Ottoman Christians) as ‘puppets of imperialists’ already in place prior to and 
during the genocide of 1915–16.  
Another strategy of genocide denialism is the distortion of normativity at the 
level of its social articulation (see Pauer-Studer and Velleman 2011). Under the guise of 
humanism and sincere ethical concern, this strategy suggests getting rid of ‘political 
considerations of victimhood’ and controversial terms such as genocide, in order to 
interpret what happened as a ‘general tragedy’ that engulfed all the people of the 
Empire. This has found its way into official statements of condolence by government 
officials, as for example illustrated by (then Prime Minister) Erdoğan’s statement from 
April 23, 2014:  
It is indisputable that the last years of the Ottoman Empire were a difficult period, 
full of suffering for Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Armenian and millions of other 
Ottoman citizens, regardless of their religion or ethnic origin. Any conscientious, 
fair and humanistic approach to these issues requires an understanding of all the 
sufferings endured in this period, without discriminating as to religion or 
ethnicity.7 
The Turkish government’s official term for this new approach or policy of 
remembrance is that of just memory, as employed later in the statement: ‘The incidents 
of the First World War are our shared pain. To evaluate this painful period of history 
through a perspective of just memory is a humane and scholarly responsibility.’ This 
statement was given one day prior to the official, annual commemoration of the 
Armenian genocide and it is not only used to entrench denialism but to further discredit 
claims to genocide recognition, by framing them in a negative, threatening light: 
In Turkey, expressing different opinions and thoughts freely on the events of 1915 
is the requirement of a pluralistic perspective as well as of a culture of democracy 
and modernity. Some may perceive this climate of freedom in Turkey as an 
opportunity to express accusatory, offensive and even provocative assertions and 
allegations. 
Note that by insisting that ‘all have suffered’, the policy of just memory leads to the 
contradictory conclusion that actual Armenian suffering ought to be silenced. Moreover, 
this pseudo-humanistic approach neutralizes and equates the experiences of Armenians 
during the late Ottoman period with the Muslim-Turkish citizens of the Empire, ‘whose 
ideology was habitually instated with the nationalist Union and Progress government’ 
(Aybak 2016, 135). Because of this, the insistence of Armenians on having their own 
experience of a particular injustice acknowledged instead of having it dissolved in 
some abstract, global memory of shared suffering is seen as exclusionary and 
reactionary stubbornness. Their claim to genocide recognition is reinterpreted and 
discredited as a sign of radical Armenian nationalism and terrorism, anti-Turkish 
provocation and an unwillingness to have peaceful relations with Turks. This 
polarization is further entrenched by the following excerpt of an ‘overview’ given on 
the website of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
The Armenian view of history, however, selects the Armenian suffering, 
embellishes it in several ways and presents it as a genocide – a crime defined in 
international law – perpetrated by Turks against Armenians. The acceptance of this 
version by others has become the national objective for Armenia and the radical 
groups within the Armenian Diaspora. […] During the 1970s and onwards, such 
nationalistic zeal led to a terror campaign that took the lives of 31 Turkish 
diplomats and their family members, as well as 43 people from Turkish and other 
nationalities, and wounded many.8 
Even though the Armenian genocide is framed as an ‘ongoing matter of legitimate 
scholarly debate’, the basic premise that Armenians suffered a particular injustice is 
categorically denied. Such statements implicitly entail the commitment to present 
history in a way so as to interpret away that Armenians, as an inferior group, have 
suffered injustice at the hands of the dominant and dominating group defined as Turks. 
As succinctly analysed by Theriault, this leads to flawed frameworks for 
conceptualizing Armenian-Turkish relations that ‘treat Armenians and Turks as two 
parties to a conflict or disagreement that can enter into some form of negotiative or 
dialogue process as roughly equal partners’ (2009, 91). It obscures that the genocide 
was the middle phase of an overarching relationship of Turkish domination of 
Armenians. Considered this way, genocide emerged from within a dominating 
institutional context that has already attained legitimacy, making ongoing genocide 
denialism a means to maintaining such domination.  
 What epistemological insights can we draw from this? The denialism 
investigated here does not just refer to the telling of known falsities or withholding of 
(known) truth with the intention to deceive and mislead others. Rather, systematic 
efforts are taken to distort evidence and create a new, wholly opposite understanding 
that consists not merely of a lack of true beliefs about the Armenian genocide, but a 
motivated establishment and imposition of an alternative, distorted reality or world-
view. It can be upheld by psychological mechanisms such as wishful thinking and self-
defence that keep one from seeking the truth in the first place —hence constituting 
‘willful ignorance’ (see e.g. Pohlhaus Jr. 2012, 731–733). However, denialism also 
presents an epistemic practice that produces conditions under which it becomes difficult 
or at least risky for affected individuals to form proper knowledge and understanding, 
even if they are generally open-minded. Against this background, genocide denial 
becomes a complex phenomenon on the individual cognitive psychological, socio-
political as well as normative level, presenting what Alcoff (2007) calls a substantive 
practice of ignorance. On this account, ignorance goes beyond the propositional level 
and involves the agent’s epistemic behaviour more generally, including the attitudes (or 
norms and policies) that guide that behaviour. We can explain such ignorant agency by 
taking into account structural conditions that produce identities, social locations and 
modes of belief formation, which in some cases, can become epistemically 
disadvantageous or defective (Ibid., 40).  
From a social-political point of view, genocide denialism functions to maintain a 
system of (in the case at hand, ethnonational) domination. To evaluate genocide 
denialism through the framework of substantive ignorance makes it possible to see how 
this is also epistemically relevant in an immediate sense, in that it gives rise to particular 
cognitive norms that constitute perniciously ignorant epistemic agents. On the one hand, 
there is individual denial, which are conscious or unconscious cognitive mechanisms 
through which individuals engage in practices of denial. On the other hand, there is the 
institutional and structural dimension of denialism that nurtures and informs but also 
goes beyond individual denial. Both levels and their interrelation have to be considered 
for an analysis of how genocide denialism itself constitutes injustice, or as I argue, 
testimonial oppression. Testimonial oppression is not perpetrated merely through 
isolated acts of denial owing to individual biases or psychological defence mechanisms. 
Rather, it is embedded in particular institutional background conditions and structures 
(of domination) that are sustained through individual repetition and habit. Thus, 
testimonial oppression tracks patterns of pernicious epistemic behaviour that maintain 
unjust social relations over time. In the following section, I demonstrate how such 
conditions render communicative encounters on matters of genocide persistently 
dysfunctional by giving rise to testimonial smothering. For this purpose, I first discuss 
some of the characteristics of the testimony we are concerned with and spell out the 
particular relationship between speakers and hearers when it comes to genocide-related 
testimony under non-ideal conditions of genocide denialism. 
IV – Genocide Denial: Speaker Vulnerabilities and Testimonial 
Incompetence 
The conditions illustrated in the previous section have serious long-term effects on the 
social imagination of the Armenian people in Turkey and beyond, but also on how hearers 
comprehend, interpret and receive their testimony in relation to past genocide, leaving 
testifiers vulnerable to unapt and epistemically depriving responses. For my following 
analysis, I am not primarily interested in racist hate speech that explicitly justifies 
genocide or incites violence against members of the former victim group. Rather, my 
concern is with every day, possibly ‘naïve’ denial that can take various forms of epistemic 
resistance to and discredit of testimony on genocide, where such resistance is owed to 
more pervasive ignorance. I am therefore using the term denial in a broad sense, also 
covering disputation and (pseudo-) scepticism. Consider the following encounters 
narrated by the Argentinian-Armenian artist Silvina Der-Meguerditchian: 
Today I spoke to D., a Turkish student […] I asked if she wanted to be in my 
collection of Turkish/Armenian encounters. […] When I described the project, I told 
her where my grandparents came from and that they had survived the genocide. She 
looked a bit uncomfortable and said: “We don’t know whether that happened or not.” 
[...] I wanted to cry… This student had been so nice to me and so friendly and recent 
experiences had been so positive that I felt especially hurt when she said: “We don’t 
know whether that happened or not.” […] How is one to bear the fact that someone 
so young and warm and friendly says she doesn’t know if something that shaped and 
defines one’s whole existence happened or not? (Der-Meguerditchian 2011, 24) 
*** 
As soon as we were introduced, I felt the need to tell T. that we came from the same 
place or had something in common. I didn’t say that to provoke him. I think I was 
very naïve. I told him that my grandparents were also from Turkey and had had to 
leave, that they were survivors of the genocide. “Genocide?” He said, “What 
genocide?” THAT NEVER HAPPENED. The piece of bread I was chewing stuck 
in my throat. Without saying a word, I stood up and left. […] I think this experience 
rather clearly marked a long pause in my attempt to re-establish some form of 
relationship with Turks. (8) 
Both encounters left Der-Meguerditchian disappointed or even betrayed, hurt, and 
speechless. I take these to be fairly typical or common examples of everyday denial 
experienced by Armenians in Turkey and abroad. Even without taking the context of 
genocide denialism into account, they present rather strange kinds of conversations, and 
I doubt that we would normally expect responses like this to the kind of information 
offered, particularly in the student’s case given their positive and friendly relationship.9 I 
suggest that these encounters present cases of miscommunication, in which the hearer 
takes the speaker’s words to mean something that she did not intend to convey and which 
provokes a defensive sceptical response on behalf of the hearer. Indeed, as demonstrated 
in the previous section, the term genocide can carry particular, contextually established 
associations through which its expression is misinterpreted as an attempt to convey 
inappropriate accusations, provocations and immoral sentiments towards the socially 
dominant group.10 This can at least partially explain why her testimony prompts such 
arguably inadequate and hurtful responses.  
To understand the normative implications of such testimonial encounters and 
experiences, I suggest an account of testimony as an act of communication, whereby a 
speaker intends to convey particular information to an audience and, by conveying the 
information, expects a certain response from the hearer, including recognition of how the 
speaker intends the information. That is, the hearer is expected to exercise testimonial 
competence as well as respect any emotional or practical risks to which testimony might 
expose the speaker. I argue that genocide denialism systematically hampers the ability of 
hearers to fulfil these demands, thereby instituting ‘a harmful practice of silencing’ 
(Dotson 2011, 241). According to Dotson, a practice of silencing—as opposed to 
instances of silencing— ‘concerns a repetitive, reliable occurrence of an audience failing 
to meet the dependencies of a speaker that finds its origin in a more pervasive ignorance’ 
(Ibid). The way in which the Turkish societal context frames the ‘Armenian genocide 
debate’ not only renders testimony on the Armenian genocide misunderstandable, but 
also creates the risk that it reinforces negative identity prejudice. Given that testimony on 
the Armenian genocide is characterized as an accusatory, baseless expression of radical 
Armenian nationalism, Turcophobia or Islamophobia, it becomes unsafe and risky 
testimony insofar as hearers might take it as evidence for their perceptions of Armenians 
as agitators and provocateurs. This likely coerces the latter to silence themselves in order 
not to risk the further endangerment of their community.  
Of course, the term genocide is evaluative and, particularly in its legal use, includes 
an accusatory element. Such testimony can prompt defensive reactions if the hearer takes 
this accusation personally and, further, lacks the capacity or resources necessary to 
distance him or herself from the genocide in other ways than denial or challenge. 
However, I believe that a further aspect of testimonial incompetence cultivated by 
genocide denialism is the inability to distinguish an accusation, for example, from a 
personal report. In the latter case, such defensive responses are not only unwarranted but 
also fail to make sense.11 Moreover, genocide denialism likely cultivates testimonial 
incompetence due to the framing of the Armenian genocide as an ongoing debate reserved 
for historians as well as a purely legal matter, thereby distorting and deflecting from the 
social-moral dimension of genocide testimony. It bans such conversations from the 
social-moral sphere and refers it to the realm of supposedly neutral and objective legal 
and historical fact-finding. This likely disposes hearers to treat testimony on genocide 
merely as a piece of potential evidence for a legally and historically disputable fact. 
However, particularly in conversations such as the ones cited above, the speaker reports 
on a morally important personal and social matter and trusts the hearer to acknowledge 
this intention, instead of being subjected to unapt scrutiny. In such personal testimony, 
the testifier herself vouches for its truth, and it would be misguiding to assign it mere 
probative value that needs to be corroborated by further pieces of evidence. In fact, it 
would not only be misguiding; if we understand such reports as an invitation to trust both 
in the truth of its content and in the speaker herself in terms of her personal (in the case 
at hand, intergenerational) experience of that propositional content, it ‘raises the stakes 
of a report, and disbelief in the report is subsequently a stronger repudiation than it is for 
tellings generally’ (Herbert 2019, 18). These stakes are captured by Der-Meguerditchian 
when she complains: “How is one to bear the fact that someone so young and warm and 
friendly says she doesn’t know if something that shaped and defines one’s whole 
existence happened or not?” 
The seriousness of these stakes indicates that certain kinds and conditions of 
testimony require bringing to bear other forms of assertion/expression and more complex 
ways of their evaluation. Surely, testimony is, like perception and reason, a crucial but 
fallible epistemic source, hence it ought to be practiced critically. However, there is a 
substantial difference in critically assessing testimony between a broad view of testimony 
as ‘all kinds of tellings’ including everyday instances of informing, and, more 
specifically, testimony involving personal information or experiences of injustice. People 
do not have a particular interest and stake when telling people what time it is or giving 
road directions, but they do so when sharing personal experiences and information. 
Moreover, if someone testifies to genocide, one seems to be not merely stating a fact, but 
expressing a moral judgment. Now, the encounters mentioned at the outset of this section 
might not seem like evident cases of moral testimony: Der-Meguerditchian is not stating, 
“what my grandparents experienced was morally wrong and moreover, constituted 
genocide”, inviting the hearer to acquire a trust-based moral belief about these historical 
events. Rather, her report presupposes shared moral understanding. Presupposing that 
they have a shared normative background, a testimonially competent hearer arguably 
would understand, or at the least try to understand, that the primary intention of the 
speaker was not to make a baseless accusation or invite the hearer to debate the concept 
of genocide, but rather to seek proper recognition of the personal report offered. At least, 
this is what the speaker trusts the hearer to do. Systematic disappointment or betrayal of 
such trust, then, can ultimately give rise to testimonial smothering.12  
This suggests that testimony can put particular moral demands on the epistemic 
agency of speakers and hearers.13 While speakers need to weigh the risk of testimony as 
regards the reproduction of hostilities and prejudice towards their community that 
perpetuate their oppression, hearers need to indicate testimonial competence to would-be 
speakers in order not to subject them to testimonial smothering, thereby coercing them to 
act in ways that further their own oppression. In the final section, I explore some of the 
distinct harms of such testimonial oppression perpetrated particularly against members of 
the victim group. 
V – The Distinct (Epistemic) Harms of Testimonial Oppression 
Conditions of genocide denialism legitimize distrust and default scepticism towards 
testimony on genocide, which systematically deprives testifiers of epistemic recognition. 
We can distinguish two dimensions and mechanisms of such deprivation, or epistemic 
misrecognition: on the one hand, genocide denialism discredits the victim group as a 
whole by attributing various negative characteristics to the group. This is done, for 
example, by systematically portraying Armenians as suggestible, as supposedly adopting 
inadequate hermeneutical resources (i.e. genocide) to interpret their past, because their 
experiences and memories have been distorted through ‘a myth of genocide’ in order to 
legitimize Armenian nationalism and imperial power play (e.g., Altanian 2017, 29–32). 
It is not incidental that the denigration or general social and moral misrecognition of a 
particular group gives rise to a whole set of accompanying prejudices, including 
misrecognition of their status as knowers. This makes for a very systematic and persistent 
social injustice, oppressing them on various dimensions of social activity, such as 
economic, educational, professional, legal, political, moral, and epistemic activity 
(Fricker 2007, 27). Accordingly, practices of genocide denial can be based on such 
identity (‘tracker’) prejudice and therefore systematically target particular knowers, but 
not necessarily.  
On the other hand, genocide denialism entails factual and normative distortions of 
the subject matter of genocide. Here, epistemic contributions are rejected insofar as they 
threaten the dominant and dominating understanding of the genocide and thereby the 
whole belief system that supports this understanding. Thus, beyond misrecognizing social 
identities, genocide denialism misrecognizes and targets particular information.14 Note 
that this second dimension makes it likely that all members of society are coerced to 
silence themselves on genocide. In the case of the Armenian genocide, which is a national 
security issue in Turkey, the AKP government, especially since 2015, has been cracking 
down on anyone publicly criticizing the current power structures and defending minority 
interests and rights, including the right to genocide recognition. The recent decision of 
the Turkish government to establish ‘a new autonomous and civil institution’ in order ‘to 
respond to the accusations of genocide and to develop a strategy [to counter them]’15 
further demonstrates that there is no intention to back down from the state-sanctioned 
policy of genocide denialism. This decision comes a few years after the Turkish 
Parliament’s constitutional committee passed a bill banning the use of the term Armenian 
genocide on July 21, 2017.16 While this ultimately epistemically harms all members of 
society in particular ways, the way in which the subject matter of genocide is framed in 
this societal context has distinct implications for members of the former victim group. 
The subject matter is polarized to the extent that any admission of injustice and 
accountability would amount to treason against the Turkish state and to promoting the 
disunity of the Turkish nation. Hence, because the two dimensions of genocide denialism 
are not separable, but both constitute the discursive structure of genocide denialism, even 
non-members fighting for genocide recognition might feed into the oppression of 
historically marginalized members of the former victim group. 
In addition, there is a mutually reinforcing loop between the two dimensions: 
Under conditions of pervasive ignorance about genocide, the fragile testimony of thusly 
marginalized will appear implausible to the testimonially incompetent hearer, which may 
ultimately feed into and perpetuate distrust. On the other hand, hearers with prior distrust 
can seek corroboration of such distrust. As Jones has pointed out, distrust 
puts in place a suspicious cognitive set that colors how we will interpret the words of 
another. It leads us to look for signs of deception, irrationality, or incompetence and thus 
leads us to seek out evidence of inconsistencies, to magnify those we suppose ourselves 
to have found, and to focus on them in our assessment of the story as a whole. (Jones 
2002, 159) 
For the remainder of this section, I shall briefly elaborate how the moral notion of 
recognition can be epistemically relevant in such an immediate sense, distinctly harming 
members of the former victim group. For this purpose, I refer to Congdon’s (2018) 
application of Honneth’s threefold conception of recognition—based on love, respect, 
and esteem—to the epistemic realm. I shall only discuss the first two, since esteem is a 
non-egalitarian notion bound to individual achievement, which is not particularly relevant 
to my argument here. 
Epistemic love refers to attention, encouragement, and patience given to potential 
knowers to develop their sense of epistemic trust and epistemic confidence. As Congdon 
(2018, 12) notes, ‘the recipient of epistemic love is given a chance to view herself from 
the perspective of others as one whose epistemic neediness and social dependence is 
acknowledged as legitimate, or worth caring for’. Trust and empathy can play an 
important role here. Since epistemic love points to something we need a sufficient amount 
of in order to develop our epistemic capacities, thus pointing to a quantitative type of 
recognition (cf. Medina 2018), suffering epistemic neglect is particularly severe when it 
occurs persistently and systematically (cf. Fricker 2007, 29, 49–50). It can eventually lead 
to a loss of confidence in one’s beliefs or general intellectual capacities and ultimately, a 
loss of knowledge. Epistemic confidence refers to a condition where epistemic agents can 
learn to rely on their cognitive capacities—e.g., if they have proven to be taken up well, 
or if they have been recognized as valuable contributors to testimonial exchange. 
Epistemic confidence can thereby support the development of certain intellectual virtues, 
such as ‘intellectual courage, the virtue of not backing down in one’s convictions too 
quickly in response to challenge’ (Fricker 2007, 49). Intellectual self-trust is a more 
general (positive) attitude towards ourselves, or as Jones puts it, ‘a stance that an agent 
takes towards her own cognitive methods and mechanisms, comprising both cognitive 
and affective elements, and revealed in the agent’s perception of reasons to withhold or 
defer in her judgment on the basis of their deliverances’ (Jones 2012, 238). It manifests 
itself in confidence, ‘in dispositions willingly to rely on the deliverances of one’s methods 
and to assert what is believed on their basis, and in modulating self-reflection’ (245). 
Retaining such intellectual self-trust—and respectively, epistemic confidence—can 
therefore be crucial for retaining agency as well as resisting epistemic injustice.17  
Applying these implications of epistemic neglect to my case study reveals that 
persistent and systematic genocide denial can cause members of the former victim group 
to lose confidence in their beliefs (or reasons for their beliefs) about what happened to 
their ancestors, their ability to assess historical sources of evidence—including 
biographies, memoirs, and testimonies—and to detect injustice. This would also render 
them unable to understand their present living conditions and the social relations that 
shape how they can navigate society, unable to understand the distress that goes along 
with being a member of the former victim group, the constant threats to their lives through 
dominating and oppressive institutions, and to understand properly the 
(intergenerationally) transmitted memories of trauma and vulnerability from their family 
and fellow group members. Ultimately, it can prevent them from re-asserting their 
identity and realizing their moral and political agency: from appropriately protesting their 
structurally inferior position. This makes evident that genocide denialism inherently 
connects both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, as it involves both unjust 
constraints on their hermeneutical capacity to render their (historical) experiences 
intelligible to themselves and to others, and on their capacity to testify to past and present 
injustice, both of which are crucial for personhood and responsible, moral agency (e.g., 
Campbell 2003, 41–43).18  
Another recognition failure relates to epistemic respect, that is, to ‘respect 
someone qua knower irrespective of the differential strengths and weaknesses by which 
we typically judge knowers’ (Congdon 2018, 13). Epistemic respect means to regard one 
another as equals in the space of reasons, to acknowledge mutual answerability and hold 
each other responsible in the give and take of reasons. In turn, epistemic disrespect is ‘a 
violation of the implicit normative promise that all knowers be subjected to the same basic 
standards of criticism within the space of reasons’ (15). Genocide denialism subjects 
members of the former victim group to unwarranted standards of criticism due to certain 
background attitudes of prejudice and inflated distrust about the epistemic and moral 
integrity of people of the speaker’s social type. To epistemically disrespect someone, 
then, means to stand towards them in a relationship of presumed distrust on morally 
culpable grounds. De-authorising and constructing identities of members of the former 
victim group as epistemically inferior, i.e., as inherently unreliable when it comes to the 
subject matter of genocide, epistemically disrespects speakers in a systematic way; they 
are not given equal standing in the practice of mutual reasoning. 
Note that under conditions of genocide denialism, testimonial smothering is a 
potential threat: under such conditions, it is likely that speakers will be coerced to silence 
themselves. This does not imply that resistance to oppression is impossible and that 
everyone is unable to maintain their intellectual self-trust and epistemic confidence. 
However, identifying the potential threat and harms that an institutional practice of 
genocide denial engenders gives us a reason to acknowledge claims to genocide 
recognition as indeed acts of legitimate epistemic resistance to conditions of objectively 
unjust coercion. Such coercive power is deeply entrenched in the fibre of society and 
operates not only structurally but also in everyday personal interactions. 
VI – Conclusion 
This article presents a normative analysis of genocide denialism in its own right in order 
to identify it as an additional injustice against the (former) victim group. It does so by 
showing how genocide denialism, understood as an epistemically pernicious practice of 
ignorance, creates conditions that unjustly coerce testifiers to silence themselves. More 
specifically, genocide denialism meets the circumstances identified by Dotson (2011) 
that routinely give rise to a specific form of testimonial oppression: testimonial 
smothering. First, it renders the content of testimony (on genocide) unsafe and risky, 
insofar as it leads or contributes to the ‘formation of false beliefs that can cause social, 
political, and/or material harm’—in the case at hand, e.g., the negative prejudice against 
Armenians as treacherous agitators and provocateurs. Secondly, it cultivates substantive 
ignorance in an audience, who will thereby demonstrate testimonial incompetence to the 
speaker with respect to the content of the testimony. This is because the dominant and 
dominating agents of genocide denialism authorize, justify and impose a set of beliefs 
and understandings that constitute pernicious reliable ignorance about genocide. I 
illustrated this by reference to communicative encounters in which a descendant of 
genocide survivors offers genocide testimony in the form of a personal report, which is 
met with unapt responses of resistance and (pseudo-) scepticism on behalf of hearers 
due to various cognitive mechanisms inculcated through conditions of pervasive 
ignorance about genocide. Genocide denialism thereby undermines trust relations 
crucial for testimony and systematically deprives potential testifiers of valuable 
epistemic recognition. Systematic deprivation of such epistemic recognition can 
undermine their capacities of (self-) comprehension and reasoning, and of making 
relevant epistemic contributions in order to actively resist their oppression and seek 
social change. Ultimately, it coerces them to act in ways that further their own 
oppression. 
A proper normative analysis of genocide denialism requires acknowledging the 
interplay of institutional, structural denialism and individual, interpersonal denial. 
Genocide denialism gets its persuasiveness from the argumentative and narrative, 
factual and normative distortions whereby perpetrators of genocide have historically 
legitimized their actions and policies, subsequently nourishing ongoing denialism and 
therefore, ongoing epistemic harm towards the former victim group. 
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Notes
1  See e.g. Altanian (2017) and (2019) for earlier versions of the argument. 
2  Referring to the scholarly consensus that oppression comes out of unjust social and political 
institutions. (Cudd 2006, 20) 
3  This condition is likely owed to Cudd’s account of social groups as ‘a collection of persons 
who share (or would share under similar circumstances) a set of social constraints on action’ 
(2006, 44), which fits both voluntary and nonvoluntary social groups. According to Cudd, 
‘[o]ne of the important differences between voluntary and nonvoluntary social groups is that 
one need not recognize that one is a member of a particular nonvoluntary social group to be 
a member. One simply needs objectively to face the constraints that other members face, 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                               
whether or not one recognizes them as patterned constraints that one shares.’ (Ibid., 45) 
Hence one can belong to a social group nonvoluntarily, regardless of whether one recognizes 
said oppressive harms, and whether a social group exists is determined primarily by external 
conditions that are objectively oppressive. 
4  Dotson considers testimonial oppressions as practices of silencing of which she identifies 
two forms: testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. While in testimonial 
smothering, speakers are coerced to silence themselves due to circumstances brought about 
by socially unjust background conditions, testimonial quieting refers to the failure of an 
audience to identify a speaker as a knower due to ‘controlling images’ (false, negative 
stereotypes or prejudices) whereby a specific social identity is rendered epistemically 
disadvantaged or inferior. This resembles Fricker’s (2007, 30–41) central case of 
discriminatory, systematic testimonial injustice. Both forms are relevant to the analysis of 
genocide denialism, though testimonial smothering enables me to highlight the complexity 
of the circumstances brought about by genocide denialism, which render potential hearers 
testimonially incompetent in various ways, including possession of negative epistemic 
identity prejudice. 
5  For the purpose of this article, I will not provide a detailed positive account of what such 
testimonial competence and the respective duties and responsibilities of hearers entail. The 
primary focus is rather on the background conditions of pervasive ignorance that likely 
cultivate testimonial incompetence and the harms that resultant silencing brings about for 
potential testifiers. 
6  Note that these are examples of denialism in the aftermath of the genocide, as well as during 
and after Turkish nation state building. For a more detailed and succinct historical discussion 
of the Armenian genocide and the genocidal ideology that sought to legitimize it, see Oranlı 
(forthcoming). This also makes evident the historical continuation of said portrayal of 
Armenians from prior to after the genocide. 
7  Website of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 2020. “The unofficial translation of 
the message of H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then Prime Minister of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Republic of Turkey, on the events of 1915 (23 April 2014).” Accessed September 1, 2020. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-prime-minister-mr_-recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9Fan-published-
a-message-on-the-events-of-1915_-23-april-2014.en.mfa 
8  Website of the MFA. 2020. “The Events of 1915 and the Turkish-Armenian Controversy 
over History: An Overview.” Accessed September 1, 2020. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
events-of-1915-and-the-turkish-armenian-controversy-over-history_-an-overview.en.mfa 
9  Note that these encounters serve to illustrate a mechanism of testimonial failure I wish to 
highlight. My aim is not to thereby argue that Armenians also encounter testimonial 
smothering within the context of Germany, where these particular encounters took place 
(though they still present instances of silencing). 
10  I refer to ‘Turks’ as socially dominant in the context of Turkey, in which my analysis of 
testimonial oppression is embedded. That being said, depending on the context of the 
encounter (including existing power relations) and the persistency of genocide denial, it 
might be harmful in other ways than constitute testimonial oppression. 
11  Cassie Herbert (2019) makes a similar point in the context of the #Metoo movement, arguing 
that it was ‘centrally and powerfully about survivors issuing truth-claims about first-personal 
experiences of sexual violation’ (18), hence reports, rather than a movement of accusations. 
Accusations are speech acts that aim to hold someone accountable for their wrongdoing, 
which would require naming the perpetrator and seeking some form of sanction for his norm 
violation. As such, they are perpetrator rather than victim-survivor centred. Reports, on the 
other hand, are an ‘invitation to trust, both in terms of trusting that the content of the account 
is true and in terms of trusting in the speaker themself in terms of their first-personal 
experience of that propositional content’ (Ibid.). I thank Gaile Pohlhaus for bringing 
Herbert’s superb article to my attention. 
12  In one of her many valuable comments on my article, Gaile Pohlhaus has related this to 
Wittgensteinian language games in an enlightening way: The sense of the testimony is in 
part dictated by the rules of the game—if you are not participating in the same language 
game, you will not make sense to one another. Against this background, in contexts of 
                                                                                                                                               
oppression, one can be coercively co-opted into a language game one was not intending to 
play: In the case of detailing one’s family background, to receive this information as an 
accusation distorts the information and so prevents the sense of that information from 
circulating as intended. 
13  It is subject to further inquiry whether hearers, in light of this, are failing morally or 
epistemically, or one in virtue of the other when engaging in such practices of silencing. 
14  However, the subject matter of genocide takes on a distinct role in the former victim group’s 
self-understanding, such that its misrecognition is inherently connected to the misrecognition 
of the group itself. This is because genocide has crucial explanatory value and relevance for 
the former victim group in terms of shared historical experience and collective memory, as 
well as for understanding present-day experiences of oppression (see e.g. Altanian 2019, 
156–159). 
15   “Dr. Taner Akçam on the Recent Decision of the Turkish Government”, The Armenian 
Weekly, June 24, 2020. https://armenianweekly.com/2020/06/24/statement-of-dr-taner-
akcam-on-the-recent-decision-of-turkish-government/ 
16  “Turkish Parliament Committee Bans Mentioning of Armenian Genocide in Parliament”, 
The Armenian Weekly, July 24, 2017. https://armenianweekly.com/2017/07/24/turkish-
parliament-committee-bans-mentioning-of-armenian-genocide-in-parliament/ 
17  For a detailed discussion of the role of intellectual self-trust for dealing with epistemic 
injustice, see El Kassar 2020; El Kassar (forthcoming). 
18  I engage in a more thorough analysis of how testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are 
inherently connected in my upcoming book, The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism 
(Manuscript in preparation). 
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